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Subjective ConsciousnessA Self-Representational Theory$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570355

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001

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Self‐Representationalism and the Ontology of Consciousness

Self‐Representationalism and the Ontology of Consciousness

(p.200) 6 Self‐Representationalism and the Ontology of Consciousness
Subjective Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops an account of the ontological structure of an ordinary conscious experience. After ruling out a straightforward representational account and a functionalist account, this chapter considers a number of options for understanding the structure of consciousness in mereological terms, finally settling on one specific option.

Keywords:   functionalism, dispositions, mereology, mereological complexes, indirect representation, self‐representationalism

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