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Responsibility and Distributive Justice$
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Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199565801

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.001.0001

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Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions 1

Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions 1

Chapter:
(p.115) 5 Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions1
Source:
Responsibility and Distributive Justice
Author(s):

Zofia Stemplowska (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.003.0006

Are those who suffer disadvantage due to their own choices entitled to assistance from others as a matter of egalitarian justice? Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are usually thought to offer conflicting answers to this question. This chapter argues that the extent of conflict has been exaggerated. It proposes that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism should be disambiguated into three models — (simple) equality of opportunity, equality of opportunity for maximum advantage, and equality of opportunity for equal interests — that each take a different stance on egalitarian claim to assistance. It argues that the most widespread interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is unattractive and offers an alternative interpretation grounded in the equality of moral status. It explains why social egalitarianism itself should adopt this version of responsibility-sensitivity as a side constraint on its own egalitarian recommendations.

Keywords:   respect, responsibility, choice, distributive justice, egalitarianism, society of equals, equal moral status, social egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism, equality of opportunity

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