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Responsibility and Distributive Justice$
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Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199565801

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.001.0001

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Luck Egalitarianism and Group Responsibility 1

Luck Egalitarianism and Group Responsibility 1

(p.98) 4 Luck Egalitarianism and Group Responsibility1
Responsibility and Distributive Justice

Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen

Oxford University Press

Luck egalitarianism is often formulated as the view that it is in itself bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. This formulation is ambiguous in various ways relating to gaps between individual and collective choice. When these ambiguities are sorted out it can be seen that choice and responsibility plays a less prominent role in egalitarian justice than is normally assumed. Moreover, in some cases where responsibility matters, its relevant object is not the person's being worse off, but the person's responsibility for trying to perform a certain collective action, which suggests that responsibility matters, not non-instrumentally, but as a reliable indicator of something else, e.g., moral deservingness.

Keywords:   equality, choice, luck egalitarianism, collective action, individual choice, moral deservingness, responsibility, egalitarian justice

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