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Practical Intelligence and the Virtues$

Daniel C. Russell

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199565795

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001

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(p.415) Works Cited

(p.415) Works Cited

Source:
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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