Knowledge, Assertion, and Action
Contextualism vs. Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism
Subject-sensitive invariantism is shown to be wrong by its inability to handle certain important third-person uses of ‘know(s)’. Attention is then turned to important uses of ‘know(s)’ made in connection with certain evaluations, explanations, and predictions of agents' actions. Some writers have thought that an important advantage of subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism is to be found in the former's superior ability to account for the connections here. Particular objections to contextualism based on such considerations are answered. Finally, it is argued that contextualism actually does a better job with the relevant uses of ‘know(s)’ than does subject-sensitive invariantism, because only contextualism can handle cases where whether a subject does or does not ‘know’ is cited in connection with potential actions the subject may, or may not, take.
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