Questioning Evidentialism
The first paper in this section, by Keith DeRose, questions evidentialism in part with this challenging question: Why should evidence ground the definition of ‘epistemically ought’ rather than knowledge? He offers cases similar to ones from Axtell and Baehr in the previous section (indeed, similar to those of Kornblith’s challenge in ‘Evidentialism’ in the first place) where it seems to him that—at least in a permissible sense, if not a preferable sense—we ought not say that S ought to believe p even though p fits S’s evidence, because were S to believe p she would fail to know p.
Keywords: normativity, evidentialism
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