Evidentialism about Knowledge
John Greco challenges evidentialism about knowledge—given an internalist account of evidence—on the grounds that there are cases of knowledge in the absence of any evidencing mental state. He thinks this is true of memory knowledge, a priori knowledge, and, especially, the phenomenon known as ‘blindsight’ where people make correct judgments (or at least actions which typify certain judgments)—at a proportion greater than chance—about objects in a portion of their visual field that is blind. He also argues that the normative status required for knowledge requires a ‘modally strong connection to the world’ and no such kind of status could supervene on mental states alone.
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