The civilian tradition, as exemplified by Justinian's Institutes and the French Civil Code, has generally divided its law of civil wrongs into two categories, wrongs ‘proper’ and ‘quasi-wrongs’. Nowhere, however, does it state unambiguously the rationale, or even the content, of this dichotomy. The common law, on the other hand, has only ever had, in spite of some procedural divisions, one class of civil wrongs. From this observation, two questions arise, which will form the subject-matter of the book: How and why did the civilian tradition split up its law of wrongs, and what did it make of this division? What, if anything, could the common law learn from the civilian experience on this point?
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.