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Between Authority and Interpretation$
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Joseph Raz

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199562688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562688.001.0001

Can There be a Theory of Law?1

Chapter:
(p. 17 ) 2 Can There be a Theory of Law?1
Source:
Between Authority and Interpretation
Author(s):

Joseph Raz (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562688.003.0002

This chapter argues that a theory of law is successful if it meets two criteria: first, it consists of propositions about the law which are necessarily true, and, second, they explain what the law is. The chapter clarifies the relationship between this thesis and the traditional way of understanding the task of legal theory as explaining the concept of law. It then examines several difficulties with the idea that there can be a theory of law in general, a theory which since true is necessarily true of the law wherever and whenever it is to be found. The problems examined arise out of the changing nature of concepts, out of the dependence of law on concepts, and out of the alleged impossibility of understanding alien cultures, using alien concepts.

Keywords:   nature of law, legal theory, concept of law, traditional way

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