Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability
This chapter examines the role that intention plays in defining the most serious forms of criminality. It argues that the criminal law as it now exists presupposes what is essentially a ‘folk psychology’ of intention, and proposes as an alternative a more nuanced and complex conception of intention that would take into account recent developments in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and moral psychology.
Keywords: criminal law, intentions, criminality, moral responsibility, folk psychology
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