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Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law$
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R.A. Duff and Stuart Green

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199559152

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

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Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability

Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability

Chapter:
(p.179) 9 Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability
Source:
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law
Author(s):

Michael S Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0009

This chapter examines the role that intention plays in defining the most serious forms of criminality. It argues that the criminal law as it now exists presupposes what is essentially a ‘folk psychology’ of intention, and proposes as an alternative a more nuanced and complex conception of intention that would take into account recent developments in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and moral psychology.

Keywords:   criminal law, intentions, criminality, moral responsibility, folk psychology

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