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Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law$
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R.A. Duff and Stuart Green

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199559152

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law

Chapter:
(p. 409 ) 18 The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law
Source:
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law
Author(s):

Donald A Dripps

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0018

This chapter takes on the relationship between substance and procedure in criminal law, arguing that it must be explained with reference to competing conceptions of underlying political and moral theory. Particularly concerned with the ways in which a system of criminal procedure is meant to implement the goals of substantive criminal law, it offers three models — rationalism, pluralism, and reductionism — and explores the extent to which they should be viewed as mutually compatible or incompatible.

Keywords:   criminal law, substance, criminal procedure, rationalism, pluralism, reductionism

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