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Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law$
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R.A. Duff and Stuart Green

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199559152

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

Wrongdoing and Motivation

Chapter:
(p. 206 ) 10 Wrongdoing and Motivation
Source:
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law
Author(s):

Victor Tadros

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0010

This chapter defends the view that motivation plays a more direct role in determining what is wrong than as this view suggests. This idea helps us to clarify the structure of wrongdoing and also to understand one way in which morality and criminal law come apart. An act can be wrong in virtue of the motivation with which it was done. But, for various reasons, we have good reason not to criminalize all action that is wrong. Sometimes we will wish to tolerate wrongful action because of its desirable consequences.

Keywords:   motivations, criminal law, morality, wrongdoing

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