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Epistemological Disjunctivism
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Epistemological Disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard

Abstract

This book offers a defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief which enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). This account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporar ... More

Keywords: assertion, discrimination, disjunctivism, epistemic externalism, internalism, epistemology, evidence, knowledge, Mooreanism, perception

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2012 Print ISBN-13: 9780199557912
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Duncan Pritchard, author
University of Edinburgh

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