Appearances and Action
The apraxia objection to Scepticism is the claim that there is a feature of Scepticism as Sextus Empiricus describes it—a feature that makes Scepticism the kind of philosophy and the way of life Sextus says it is—that is incompatible with action or activity of any sort. This chapter distinguishes two versions of the apraxia objection. Sextus explicitly replies to the objection that Scepticism is incompatible with activity or behaviour of any kind. This chapter outlines Sextus' reply to this version of the apraxia objection and claims that it is adequate only if Sextus can provide some account of the difference between an appearance and a belief. A second version of the apraxia objection claims that Scepticism is incompatible with action where action is distinguished from mere activity or bodily movement. This chapter considers whether Sextus has the resources to reply to this second version of the apraxia argument when it takes as its starting point the belief‐desire model of action.
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