The Scope of Scepticism
The Scope of Scepticism is the range of candidates for belief about which the Sceptic, in virtue of being a Sceptic, suspends judgement. This chapter argues that Sextus places a restriction on the Sceptic's suspension of judgement, and so on the scope of Scepticism, insofar as he attributes, as he does at Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13, some beliefs to the Sceptic. As a result an adequate interpretation of the scope of Scepticism must draw a distinction between two kinds of belief. Dogmatic belief is belief of the kind the Sceptic, in virtue of his Scepticism, lacks; and non‐dogmatic belief is belief of the kind his Scepticism permits him to have. This chapter argues, against a line of interpretation advanced by Michael Frede, that for Sextus the distinction between dogmatic and non‐dogmatic belief is the distinction between belief about how things are and belief about how things merely appear to one to be.
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