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The Believing PrimateScientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion$
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Jeffrey Schloss and Michael Murray

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199557028

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557028.001.0001

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Does Naturalism Warrant a Moral Belief in Universal Benevolence and Human Rights?

Does Naturalism Warrant a Moral Belief in Universal Benevolence and Human Rights?

Chapter:
(p.292) 15 Does Naturalism Warrant a Moral Belief in Universal Benevolence and Human Rights?
Source:
The Believing Primate
Author(s):

Christian Smith

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557028.003.0016

This chapter considers the kind of morality that everyone would have if they inhabited a naturalistic universe. It answers the question ‘If everyone lives in the naturalistic world that much of science can tell, will there be reasons to believe in universal benevolence and human rights?’ It explains and investigates how naturalism and morality can be related or contradicting each other, which leads to the question of a survival morality. It also explains morality under natural conditions, in line with investigations previously seen.

Keywords:   morality, religion, naturalism, survival morality, gods, human rights

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