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The Waning of Materialism$
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Robert C. Koons and George Bealer

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199556182

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001

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An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject–Body Dualism

An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject–Body Dualism

(p.191) 9 An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject–Body Dualism
The Waning of Materialism

Martine Nida‐Rümelin

Oxford University Press

Subject body dualism is the view that conscious individuals (including human and non-human animals) are neither identical nor constituted by material things. An argument in favor of subject body dualism is developed which is based on a description of conceptual features of first person thought. This chapter argues that certain central conceptual features of first person thought carry over to the way we conceive of the future and the past of other conscious individuals and their identity across time. These conceptual features are deeply incorporated into the way we perceive each other and into our emotional attitudes. An indirect argument for subject body dualism is developed which is distinct from conceivability arguments: any alternative to subject body dualism implies that we suffer from a permanent and ubiquitous illusion in our cognitive and emotional life. The version of subject body dualism defended has no religious motivation, presupposition or consequences.

Keywords:   subject body dualism, subject body dualism, first person thought, other consciousness

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