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The Waning of Materialism$
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Robert C. Koons and George Bealer

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199556182

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001

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Modest Dualism 1

Modest Dualism 1

(p.233) 11 Modest Dualism1
The Waning of Materialism

Tyler Burge (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with a detailed response to the previous chapter's review of Burge's previous work on the mind-body problem, centering on empirical doubts about compositional materialism regarding psychological states. It then presents a new argument for a modest mind-body dualism. The argument centers on the point that propositional structures that support rational transactions, such as formal deductive inference, are constitutive aspects of propositional psychological states, but that since Newton, it has been a fundamental feature of physical science that the physical world is not constitutively propositional in structure. It follows from these premises, both defended briefly, that propositional psychological states and events are not physical states or events. Contrasts with traditional Cartesian dualism are sketched.

Keywords:   psychological events, mind-body problem, dualism, psychological states, propositional structure, Burge

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