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The Waning of Materialism$
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Robert C. Koons and George Bealer

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199556182

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001

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Burge's Dualism 1

Burge's Dualism 1

Chapter:
(p.215) 10 Burge's Dualism1
Source:
The Waning of Materialism
Author(s):

Bernard W. Kobes

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0010

Dualist themes in Burge's philosophy of mind are gathered and articulated. Burge's anti-individualism yields an argument against token-identity theory; his reflections on mental causation have a dualist flavor; and he doubts that the relation of mental events to neural events is one of composition or constitution. This chapter argues that compositional materialism about representational mental events would be false just in case a ‘mathematical archangel’, starting from a base of fundamental material facts, could not discern as causally salient the neural event underlying a representational event prior to identifying the representational mental event as such and its causal relations. Burge's doubts about neural composition of the mental could thus be empirically confirmed.

Keywords:   Burge, anti-individualism, mental causation, neural composition

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