How to be a Person
If reasons are public in their normative force, every agent's reasons are normative for every other's. How then can an agent have a practical identity of his own? After sketching an anti-realist account of value, the first part of this chapter proposes that the answer to that question rests in an attitude an agent can and should have towards his own identity. He can view it as a valuable instance of human possibility, a possible role in the larger human story, which he especially desires to play. That desire is not itself a reason, although in ordinary circumstances there is reason to encourage it. The second part of the chapter draws the threads of the argument of the entire book together in a summary account.
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