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Law as a Moral Idea$
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Nigel Simmonds

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199552191

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552191.001.0001

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Legality as a Value

Legality as a Value

Chapter:
(p.169) 6 Legality as a Value
Source:
Law as a Moral Idea
Author(s):

N.E. Simmonds

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552191.003.0006

Legal positivists suggested that by separating different legal questions, we can dissipate the sense of mystery that surrounds the nature of law, which springs largely from our inability to find a single satisfactory answer to the question ‘What is law?’ when it is asked at large and without an awareness of the distinct issues that it can be taken to raise. HLA Hart introduced a regimentation of questions along those lines, which tried to dissolve problems of legal philosophy by a system of legal disentanglement. The author contends that despite the widespread and long-lasting influence of this theory, all Hart did was just merely succeed in obscuring and leading people to forget the deep and intractable problem that had always been at the heart of philosophical reflection upon law.

Keywords:   legal questions, HLA Hart, legal disentanglement, philosophical reflection

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