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Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle$
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Michael Pakaluk and Giles Pearson

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199546541

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.001.0001

Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle

Chapter:
(p.159) 7 Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle
Source:
Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle
Author(s):

Heda Segvic

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546541.003.0008

How can every virtuous action be chosen, on Aristotle's view, if choice requires deliberation (since surely some situations do not permit time for deliberation)? How can Aristotle claim, and what does he mean in claiming, that deliberation is not of the end? This chapter offers distinctive interpretations of key notions in Aristotle's moral psychology in answering these questions — including choice (prohairesis), wish (or ‘rational wanting’, boulēsis), practical wisdom (phronēsis) and happiness (eudaimonia). Aristotle's notion of ethical deliberation reduces neither to instrumental reasoning, nor even to explicit reasoning that can be captured in practical arguments.

Keywords:   practical reason, choice, deliberation, phronimos, wish, practical wisdom, happiness, practical arguments

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