Deliberation and Choice in Aristotle
How can every virtuous action be chosen, on Aristotle's view, if choice requires deliberation (since surely some situations do not permit time for deliberation)? How can Aristotle claim, and what does he mean in claiming, that deliberation is not of the end? This chapter offers distinctive interpretations of key notions in Aristotle's moral psychology in answering these questions — including choice (prohairesis), wish (or ‘rational wanting’, boulēsis), practical wisdom (phronēsis) and happiness (eudaimonia). Aristotle's notion of ethical deliberation reduces neither to instrumental reasoning, nor even to explicit reasoning that can be captured in practical arguments.
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