There is no special logic of practical inferences. Intentions, like beliefs, have contents that are subject to standard logic. Yet being a special kind of belief, they have a role in causing, and not just expecting, action. Practical inference, like action itself, is in the service of an end of action, and is intelligible within that teleological perspective. ‘I will φ’ may entail ‘I will ψ’, and both be possible objects of intention, without their being intelligibly related by a practical inference; for inferring ‘I will ψ’ may get the agent who intends to φ no closer to φ-ing (as is evident when ‘ψ’ means ‘φ or χ’, with an arbitrary χ). Other inferences may look practical, but fail to serve any goal within their contingent context. The assessment of a piece of practical inference must be sensitive to the teleology of intentions.
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