This book gives an account of a crucially important episode in the post-War political history of the UK — the financial crisis of 1976 when the British Government had to seek large credit from the International Monetary Fund. The author of this book takes advantage of the privileged position he occupied at the relevant time as official head of the Treasury and of his knowledge of the business of policy formation to trace the antecedents of the crisis, and takes the reader through the complex process of economic and political analysis. The book shows how that analysis came to play such an impor ... More

This book gives an account of a crucially important episode in the post-War political history of the UK — the financial crisis of 1976 when the British Government had to seek large credit from the International Monetary Fund. The author of this book takes advantage of the privileged position he occupied at the relevant time as official head of the Treasury and of his knowledge of the business of policy formation to trace the antecedents of the crisis, and takes the reader through the complex process of economic and political analysis. The book shows how that analysis came to play such an important part in the negotiations which led to the IMF loan. It looks at both the technical and political aspects of the crisis. In its concluding section, he examines whether the political and administrative apparatus was equal to the tasks it had to tackle. The book raises some hitherto unasked questions about the inevitability of the crisis and about the measures taken to resolve it. In so doing, it aims to rekindle interest in the way the British economy was managed in the four decades following the Second World War and poses the question of whether the events described could occur in the world of today.