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Targeted Killing in International Law$

Nils Melzer

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199533169

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533169.001.0001

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(p.436) Appendix Selected Case Descriptions

(p.436) Appendix Selected Case Descriptions

Targeted Killing in International Law
Oxford University Press

The following case descriptions are provided for purposes of academic discussion only. They have been drafted based on publicly available sources, and do not necessarily represent a complete or accurate account of the actual incidents to which they refer. The cases are numbered in chronological order, starting with the earliest, and indicate the State which has either publicly acknowledged responsibility for the targeted killing in question or, in the absence of such acknowledgement, to which the operation is generally attributed.

The purpose of this compilation is to provide the reader with a separate summary of those cases, which—due to their character as ‘leading cases’ of targeted killing or because of the variety of legal questions they raise—are discussed in several parts or chapters of this analysis. Every time a specific case is referred to within the text, reference is made to the corresponding case number of this compilation. This may facilitate the reader's access to the required background information while avoiding the repetition of lengthy case descriptions throughout the book. By providing all relevant source references for the cases in question, the compilation also allows to avoid their needless repetition within the text.

Finally, yet importantly, it should be noted that the inclusion of a particular case in this compilation reflects primarily practical considerations, and does not necessarily make a statement as to the importance of that case in legal, political or moral terms as compared to cases that have not been included.

Case No. 1: McCann, Savage and Farrell (United Kingdom, 1988)

In an operation taking place in Gibraltar on 6 March 1988, British SAS operatives were charged with arresting three suspected IRA terrorists by the names of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage and Mairead Farrell. The operating soldiers had been informed ‘that there was a car bomb in place which could be detonated by any of the three suspects by means of a radio-control device which might have been concealed on their persons; that the device could be activated by pressing a button; that they would be likely to detonate the bomb if challenged, thereby causing heavy loss of life and serious injuries, and were also likely to be armed and to resist arrest’.1 When the suspects were confronted by the soldiers, and made movements with their hands which could be interpreted as a possible attempt to operate a radio-control device to detonate the bomb, the soldiers immediately opened fire at close range intentionally killing all three suspects. It was subsequently discovered that none of the suspects was armed or carrying a detonator device, and that there was no bomb in the car.2

(p.437) Case No. 2: Khalil al-Wazir—‘Abu Jihad’ (Israel, 1988)

On the morning of 16 April 1988, nine Israeli commandos entered the Tunis home of top PLO military Strategist Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad, and killed him in front of his family. Tunisia brought the matter to the UN Security Council and, on 25 April 1988, the Council passed a resolution condemning the Israeli operation as an ‘aggression’ in flagrant violation of the UN Charter, international law and norms of conduct.3 Israel never publicly acknowledged responsibility for the attack.

Case No. 3: Yahya Ayash (Israel, 1996)

On 5 January 1996, Yahya Ayash, also known as ‘The Engineer’, was killed in Gaza when his booby-trapped mobile phone exploded next to his head. Ayash had been one of the leading bomb makers of the Palestinian militant organization Hamas. Although Israel never publicly acknowledged responsibility, this killing is widely attributed to its intelligence service Shin Beit.4

Case No. 4: Khalid Mashal (Israel, 1997)

On 25 September 1997, in an operation authorized by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, two plain clothes agents of the Mossad attempted to kill the political leader of Hamas, Khalid Mashal, in Amman, Jordan. The undercover agents, who had immigrated as tourists with Canadian passports, succeeded in injecting a toxic substance into Mashal's ear, but were subsequently apprehended by the Jordanian authorities. Upon pressure by Jordanian King Hussein, Israel was forced to hand over the antidote required to save Mashal's life.5

Case No. 5: Ewald K. (Switzerland, 2000)

On 26 March 2000, during a nine-hour stand-off with the Cantonal police in Chur, Switzerland, Ewald K. repeatedly fired single shots from the balcony of his apartment in the general direction of a hotel without causing any injury or significant damage. A failed attempt by the Cantonal police at overpowering and arresting Ewald K. inside his apartment left one officer seriously wounded and one police dog killed by targeted shots from Ewald K.'s automatic military rifle. Towards the end of the afternoon, Ewald K. again (p.438) stepped onto the balcony of his apartment, holding his rifle in one hand and pointing the barrel to the floor without making any indications as to his intentions. In that moment, following a standing order by the police commander, a police sniper positioned in a neighbouring house fired a single shot at the head of Ewald K., killing him instantly.6 In the subsequent criminal proceedings before the Cantonal Court of the Grisons, the Court came to the conclusion that the order given by the accused police commander to use deliberate lethal force was justified in view of the fact that Ewald K. was armed with an automatic military rifle, and, through his own conduct, had shown that he was prepared to use it in a way that posed a grave threat to human life.7

Case No. 6: Khattab (Russia, 2002)

On or around 19 March 2002, a poisoned letter prepared by the Russian intelligence service and delivered with the help of collaborators reportedly killed Chechen rebel leader Khattab a few seconds after he opened the envelope. The Russian Government publicly acknowledged responsibility for the operation.8

Case No. 7: Salah Shehadeh (Israel, 2002)

On the night of 22 July 2002, an Israeli warplane dropped a one-ton bomb on a building in a densely populated area of Gaza City killing Hamas military wing leader Salah Shehadeh, his wife and at least 12 other uninvolved persons including nine children. More than 100 persons were injured in the attack.9 Israel publicly acknowledged responsibility for the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh and, in the same year, the Israel defence forces and the Israeli Security Agency conducted a joint inquiry into the attack.10 In 2005, a petition submitted to the Israeli Supreme Court by the Yesh Gul Peace Movement and others asking for an investigation into the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh was combined with the petition from the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), and the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW) against the governmental policy of targeted killing as a whole. Arguably, the Court's judgment of 14 December 2006 alluded to the Shehadeh case when it found it to be disproportionate ‘if the building is bombed from the air and scores of its residents and passersby are harmed’ in order to attack a single person present in that house.11

(p.439) Case No. 8: Mohammed Ishtawi Abayat (Israel, 2002)

On 13 October 2002, Mohammed Ishtawi Abayat was speaking on a booby-trapped public telephone outside the Beit Jalla Hospital near the West Bank city of Bethlehem when the telephone exploded, killing him instantly. Abayat is said to have belonged to a militia linked to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement. The Israel Defence Forces declined to comment on their responsibility for the killing.12

Case No. 9: Qaed Senyan al-Harithi (United States/Yemen, 2002)

In the early morning of 3 November 2002, six suspected al-Qaida members were killed on a desert road in Yemen when a missile fired from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operated by the CIA struck the car they were travelling in. Among those killed was Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi, suspected of masterminding the attack on the warship USS Cole off the coast of Aden in October 2000. It appears that the attack was carried out with the agreement of the Yemeni Government.13 The United States never publicly acknowledged responsibility for the attack.

Case No. 10: Saddam Hussein (United States, 2003)

At the outset of their invasion of Iraq in late March 2003, the United States launched several unsuccessful ‘decapitation attempts’ against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in an attempt to achieve quick victory. No precise information is available on the collateral damage caused by these massive operations, which included the launch of ‘two dozen cruise missiles’14 and the dropping of ‘four 2,000-pound bombs’15 on suspected hiding places of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The United States publicly acknowledged responsibility for these attacks.

Case No. 11: Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (Russia, 2004)

On 13 February 2004, Chechen rebel leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was killed in Doha, Qatar, when a bomb exploded his car. Two bodyguards were reportedly also killed, and Yandarbiev's teenage son seriously injured. Although Russia denied responsibility for the (p.440) targeted killing of Yandarbiyev, two agents belonging to the anti-terrorist unit of the Russian Embassy were arrested by the Qatari authorities, charged with murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.16

Case No. 12: Sheik Ahmed Yassin (Israel, 2004)

At daybreak on 22 March 2004, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the wheelchair-bound and half-blind spiritual leader of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, was killed in an Israeli air strike as he returned from a mosque in Gaza City. Eight other persons, among them several bodyguards including Yassin's son, were also killed, and at least 15 were injured.17 Israel has publicly acknowledged responsibility for the attack,18 which sparked widespread and virtually unanimous protest on the part of the international community,19 (p.441) and would have been condemned in a resolution of the UN Security Council but for the veto of the United States.20

Case No. 13: Abdel Aziz Rantisi (Israel, 2004)

On 17 April 2004, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, who had taken over the leadership of the militant Palestinian group Hamas after the targeted killing of his predecessor Sheik Ahmed Yassin less than one month earlier, died after an Israeli helicopter fired two missiles at his car in the Gaza Strip. Two bodyguards and Rantisi's son were also killed, and at least six uninvolved bystanders were injured in the attack, for which Israel has publicly acknowledged responsibility.21

Case No. 14: Nek Mohammad (Pakistan, 2004)

In the evening of 18 June 2004, a Pakistani military spokesman announced that Nek Muhammad, a former Taliban fighter, had been tracked by the armed forces for several days before he was killed in a targeted missile strike while having dinner with four other men in a courtyard. Nek Muhammad was suspected of sheltering foreign militants in the tribal areas and of planning terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The targeted killing occurred after a recent series of terrorist attacks had killed 72 persons in Karachi, and after repeated clashes between Nek Mohammad's followers and the Pakistani armed forces had caused at least 60 deaths on each side.22

Case No. 15: Rafik Hariri (Syria/Lebanon, 2005)

On 14 February 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others were killed when explosives equivalent to around 1,000 kilograms of TNT were detonated as his motorcade drove past the St. George Hotel in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Despite denial by both Governments, the attack is widely attributed to Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services, and led to an independent investigation by the United Nations and the subsequent (p.442) establishment by the UN Security Council of a Special Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for what it described as a ‘terrorist crime’.23

Case No. 16: Haitham al-Yemeni (United States/Pakistan, 2005)

According to an allegation transmitted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions to the Governments of Pakistan and the United States, Haitham al-Yemeni, a suspected senior figure in the terrorist organizational-Qaida, was killed on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border on or around 10 May 2005 by a missile fired from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Al-Yemeni had reportedly been under surveillance for more than a week by US intelligence and military personnel before the CIA-operated UAV located and attacked him in Toorikhel, Pakistan, an area where the Pakistani armed forces were allegedly looking for al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden.24 Neither the United States nor Pakistan have publicly acknowledged responsibility for the targeted killing of al-Yemeni.

Case No. 17: Jean Charles de Menezes (United Kingdom, 2005)

After the devastating suicide-bomb attacks in the London underground system of 7 July 2005 and the subsequent failed bomb attacks of 21 July 2005, the Metropolitan Police searched for the perpetrators of the failed attempts and, apparently due to poor intelligence, mistook a Brazilian citizen, Jean Charles de Menezes, for one of the suspects. On 22 July 2005, de Menezes was followed by plain clothes police officers when he left his apartment and took a bus to the Stockwell underground station. While it continues to be disputed whether de Menezes, as claimed by the police, was ordered to stop by the officers when he entered the station, whether he hurdled the barrier leading to the underground system to escape the officers, and whether he wore a voluminous coat which could have concealed an explosive belt, it seems to be established that he started to run when he saw a train arriving, that he was pursued by the officers onto the train and that, inside the train, he was deliberately killed by between five and nine shots to his head at close range. Tragically, de Menezes turned out to be completely uninvolved, unarmed and harmless.25 On 17 July 2006, based on an inquiry conducted by (p.443) the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC),26 the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) declared that there was insufficient evidence to initiate criminal prosecutions against any individual officer.27 The CPS concluded, however, that the operational errors observed justified the prosecution of the Office of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, as such, for failing to provide for the health, safety and welfare of de Menezes on 22 July 2005, an offence under the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act.28 On 11 May 2007, the IPCC announced that the available evidence was also insufficient for disciplinary charges against the 11 front-line firearms and surveillance officers involved in the shooting of de Menezes, but that the decision about whether the commanders and tactical advisors responsible for the planning and preparation of the operation should face disciplinary action would be taken only after completion of the trial against the Office of Commissioner under the Health and Safety at Work Act, which was expected to begin in October 2007.29

Case No. 18: Rigoberto Alpizar (United States, 2005)

On 7 December 2005, American Airlines Flight 924 from Medellin (Colombia) to Orlando, (Florida) was on a stopover in Miami airport. During the stopover, passenger Rigoberto Alpizar, apparently due to an argument with his wife who was sitting next to him, became very agitated, repeatedly insisted that he had to ‘get off the plane’ and ran towards the door, which the flight crew had not yet closed. Although his wife ran after him, reportedly yelling that he was ‘sick’ and had a ‘disorder’, two undercover air marshalls confronted Alpizar near the cockpit, followed him onto the boarding bridge and ordered him to get on the ground. When Alpizar did not comply with that order but appeared to reach into his bag, the officers opened fire, killing Alpizar with several shots. (p.444) According to the air marshalls, Alpizar had threatened that he had a ‘bomb’ in his bag, a claim that remains contronversial among witnesses but was accepted as an established fact in the final report of the investigating State Attorney. No criminal proceedings were initiated against the involved officers.30

Case No. 19: Ayman al-Zawahiri (United States, 2006)

Early on 13 January 2006, a failed missile attack directed against Ayman al-Zawahiri, the alleged second in command of the terrorist organization al-Qaida, caused at least 18 incidental deaths and destroyed several houses in the Pakistani village of Damadola close to the Afghan border. Despite the lack of an official recognition by the United States, the attempted targeted killing of al-Zawahiri is widely attributed to the CIA. The Government of Pakistan summoned the US Ambassador and lodged a formal protest against the attack, which apparently took place without consent or knowledge of the Pakistani authorities.31

Case No. 20: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (United States/Iraq, 2006)

On 7 June 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of the terrorist group al-Qaida in Iraq, was killed in an airstrike by US forces. Al-Zarqawi was killed along with seven other alleged militants when US warplanes dropped two 500-pound bombs on an ‘isolated safe house’ outside the town of Baqubah, north of Baghdad. At the time of the attack, the house in question was surrounded by US and Iraqi forces but, according to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, it was deemed impossible in the prevailing circumstances to try to capture al-Zarqawi without running the risk of letting him escape.32


(1) ECtHR, McCann Case, § 195.

(2) Ibid, §§ 198 f.

(3) UNSC Resolution 611 of 25 April 1988. See also: Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination, p. 626; David, Fatal Choices, p. 4.

(4) BBC News, Israel Investigates Raid Deaths, 28 August 2000, at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk> USA Today, Israeli soldiers kill six Palestinians, 13 October 2002 at: <http://www.usatoday.com>, with additional references to similar cases;Laura King, Hama's Past Explored In Analyzing Present Crisis In Israel, Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2004; Conal Urquhart, Killing of Arafat's Cousin Triggers Turmoil, The Guardian, 8 September 2005 at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk>.

(5) See the summary of the report on the Mashal Affair (17 February 1998) published by the Israel MFA, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il>. See further:BBC News, Profile: Hamas Leader Khaled Meshaal, 24 March 2004 available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(6) Vollenweider/Akeret-Blatter, Amok und ‘finaler Rettungsschuss’, p. 181; Cavegn, Strafkammer KG/GR 28.2.2002, p. 365.

(7) Cantonal Court Grisons, Ewald K. Case, §§ 12, 13.

(8) BBC News, Chechens ‘Confirm’ Warlord's Death, 29 April 2002 on <http://news.bbc.co.uk>. See alsoPravda, 24 June 2002, at: <http://english.pravda.ru>.

(9) CNN, Israeli General Apologizes for Civilian Deaths, 23 July 2003, available at: <http://www.cnn.com.>

(10) See Israel MFA, Findings of the inquiry into the death of Salah Shehadeh, press release communicated by IDF spokesman, 2 August 2002, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il>.See also Michael Sfard, Either Court, or House of Lords, Haaretz, 14 September 2005, available at: <http://www.haaretz.com>;Yuval Yoaz, High Court to hear petitions against targeted assassination, Haaretz, 11 December 2005, available at: <http://www.haaretz.com>.

(11) Israel HCJ, PCATI v Israel, § 46. See also above II.4.3., pp. 32 ff.

(12) BBC News, Palestinian Dies in Phone Box Blast, 13 October 2002, at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;Chris McGreal, Israeli phone box bomb kills militant, The Guardian, 15 October, 2002 at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk>;Middle East Information Center, Israeli Phone Bomb Kills Palestinian Militant, 18 October 2002, at: <http://www.middleeastinfo.org>.

(13) Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), 13 January 2003 (E/CN.4/2003/3), §§ 37 f.;Brian Whitaker and Duncan Campbell, CIA missile kills al-Qaida suspects, The Guardian, 5 November 2002, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk>;CNN, U.S. kills Cole suspect, 5 November 2002, available at: <http://www.cnn.com> David Johnston and David E. Sanger, Yemen Killing Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, New York Times, 6 November 2002; Dana Priest, Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, Washington Post, 15 May 2005, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. See also Hersh, Manhunt.

(14) Julian Borger and James Meek, Bid to Assassinate Saddam, The Guardian, 20 March 2003, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk>.

(15) David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, A Nation at War: Combat; U.S. Blasts Compound in Effort to Kill Hussein, New York Times, 8 April 2003, available at: <http://nytimes.com>.

(16) BBC News, Top Chechen Killied in Qatar Blast, 13 February 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;BBC News, Russia Behind Chechen Murder, 30 June 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;NZZ, Russische Spione in Katar wegen Mordes verurteilt, 30 June 2004, available at: <http://www.nzz.ch>;BBC News, Was Russia Behind Chechen's Death?, 26 February 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;Quénivet, Consequences of the “Missed” Extradition. For the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov denying Russian responsibility for the killing see Pravda, Qatar Authorities Arrested Murderers of Yandarbiev. Russian Foreign Ministry Furious, 26 February 2004, available at: <http://english.pravda.ru>.

(17) Amos Harel and Arnon Regular, Hamas Chief Ahmed Yassin Killed in IAF Strike in Gaza, Haaretz, 22 March 2004, available at: <www.haaretz.com>;BBC News, Hamas Chief Killed in Air Strike, 22 March 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(18) Israel MFA, Leader of Hamas Terror Organization Ahmed Yassin Killed in IDF Attack, press release communicated by IDF spokesman, 22 March 2004, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il>.

(19) See, for example, European Union, Press Release 7383/04 (Presse 80) of 22 March 2004, p. 8: ‘The Council condemned the extra-judicial killing of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin and seven other Palestinians by Israeli forces this morning. The European Union has consistently opposed extra-judicial killings. Not only are extra-judicial killings contrary to international law, they undermine the concept of the rule of law which is a key element in the fight against terrorism’. UN Secretary-General, Press Release SG/SM/9210 of 22 March 2004: ‘The Secretary-General strongly condemns Israel's assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, which resulted in the deaths of eights others. [ … ] He reiterates that extrajudicial killings are against international law and calls on the Government of Israel to immediately end this practice’. UNHRComm's Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Press Release of 23 March 2004: ‘The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, Asma Jahangir, is aghast at the planned and deliberate extrajudicial execution of Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, which also resulted in the deaths of seven other civilians on 22 March 2004. [ … ] She also calls on the Israeli Forces to immediately end this unacceptable practice so as to comply with international human rights standards’. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press Release of 22 March 2004, ‘expressed deep concern over Israel's continued use of assassination’ and specified that the use of ‘targeted killings raises serious questions of legality and proportionality’. UNHRComm, Press Release HR/CN/1057 of 24 March 2004, in which the Commission strongly condemned the ‘tragic assassination of Sheik Ahmed Yassin on 22 March 2004 in contravention of the Hague Convention IV of 1907’. For further official reactions, seeBBC News, World Reacts to Yassin Killing, 22 March 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;BBC News, Press Outrage Over Yassin Murder, 23 March 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.The Israeli MFA, Press Release of 22 March 2004, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il> argued, inter alia, that ‘Yassin was the dominant authority of the Hamas leadership, which was directly involved in planning, orchestrating and launching terror attacks carried out by the organization. In this capacity, Yassin personally gave his approval for the launching of Kassam rockets against Israeli cities, as well as for the numerous Hamas terrorist bombings and suicide operations’. For supportive opinions, seeLee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr., What Israeli Illegality?, The Yassin Assassination was Perfectly Lawful, National Review Online, 25 March 2004, available at: <http://www.bakerlaw.com>;Ariel Cohen, Targeted Killling, The Washington Times, 26 March 2004, available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com>.

(20) UN Security Council, Press Release SC/8039 of 25 March 2004, according to which a ‘draft resolution that would have condemned the most recent extra-judicial execution of Sheik Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians on Monday and would have called for a complete cessation of extra-judicial killings way defeated in the Security Council today, owing to a veto by the United States, a permanent member of the Council’. Of 15 members, 11 had been in favour, 1 against (United States) and 3 abstained (Germany, Romania, United Kingdom).

(21) The New York Times, Hamas Vows to Avenge Israel's Killing of Rantissi, 18 April 2004 available at: <http://www.nytimes.com>;NZZ, Israel tötet Hamas-Führer Rantisi, 17 April 2004, available at: <http://www.nzz.ch=; BBC News, Profile: Hamas Leader Rantissi, 17 April 2004 on<http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(22) SeeDavid Rohde and Mohammed Khan, Ex-Fighter for Taliban Dies in Strike in Pakistan, The New York Times, 19 June 2004, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com>;BBC News, Pakistan army kills tribal leader, 18 June 2004, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(23) See the report of 19 October 2005 by Detlev Mehlis, Head of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission prepared pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1595 (7 April 2005), to investigate the Hariri murder (S/2005/662). According to § 216 of the report, ‘there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act’. See also UNSC Resolution 1757 (30 May 2007).

(24) Report of the Special Rapporteur (Executions), Addendum of 26 March 2006 (E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1), pp. 183 f., 264 f.Reported also in: Dana Priest, Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, Washington Post, 15 May 2005, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, Washington Post, 30 December 2005, p. A01, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

(25) BBC News, Man shot dead by police on Tube, 22 July 2005 at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>; BBC News, ‘Shoot-to-kill’ policy to remain, 25 July 2005 at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;BBC News, Leak disputes Menezes death story, 17 August 2005 at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;NZZ, Londons Polizei unter Druck, 18 August 2005, at: <http://www.nzz.ch>;FAZ, Todesschüsse in London, Scotland Yard in Erklärungsnot, 19 August 2005, at: <http://www.faz.net>.

(26) BBC News, Menezes report handed in to CPS, 19 January 2006 on <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(27) According to the CPS: ‘The two officers who fired the fatal shots did so because they thought that Mr de Menezes had been identified to them as a suicide bomber and that if they did not shoot him, he would blow up the train, killing many people. In order to prosecute those officers, we would have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that they did not honestly and genuinely hold those beliefs. In fact, the evidence supports their claim that they genuinely believed that Mr de Menezes was a suicide bomber and, therefore, as we cannot disprove that claim, we cannot prosecute them for murder or any other related offence. Mr de Menezes was not a suicide bomber. I therefore considered the actions of all those involved in the operation to see how it was that an innocent man came to be mistaken for a suicide bomber. I concluded that while a number of individuals had made errors in planning and communication, and the cumulative result was the tragic death of Mr de Menezes, no individual had been culpable to the degree necessary for a criminal offence.’ (BBC News, CPS statement on Menezes report, 17 July 2006 on<http://news.bbc.co.uk>). The High Court dismissed a subsequent claim by family members of de Menezes that the CPS decision violated their human rights (BBC News, Menezes family lose court battle, 14 December 2006 on <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

(28) According to the CPS: ‘[T]he operational errors indicate that there had been a breach of the duties owed to non-employees under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, by the Office of Commissioner of Police and I have authorized a prosecution under that act. I must stress that this is not a prosecution of Sir Ian Blair in his personal capacity, but will be a prosecution of the Office of Commissioner, as the deemed employer of the Metropolitan Police officers involved in the death of Mr de Menezes’ (BBC News, CPS statement on Menezes report, 17 July 2006 on<http://news.bbc.co.uk>).

(29) IPCC, Jean Charles de Menezes: IPCC Makes Decision on Shooting Discipline, Press Release of 11 May 2007, available at: <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr110507_stockwell.htm>.

(30) Miami State Attorney, Interoffice Memorandum (23 May 2006), particularly pp. 43 ff.See also CNN, Man killed after bomb claim at airport, 7 December 2005 at: <http://www.cnn.com>.CNN, White House backs air marshals’ actions, 8 December 2005 at: <http://www.cnn.com>.Siobhan Morrissey, Eyewitness: ‘I Never Heard the Word “Bomb” ’, Time, 8 December 1005, available at: <http://www.time.com>.

(31) Haaretz, Pakistan to Summon U.S. Ambassador to Protest Air Strike, 14 January 2006, available at: <www.haaretz.com>;NZZ, Heftige Proteste in Pakistan nach US-Bombenangriff, 16 January 2006, available at: <http://www.nzz.ch> BBC News, US defends Pakistan Terror Drive, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>; Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, p. 96.

(32) Multinational Force Iraq, Coalition Forces Kill Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Press Release of 8 June, 2006, available at: <http://www.mnf-iraq.com>; Dworkin, The Strike Against Zarqawi.