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Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics$
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Maudemarie Clark

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199371846

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199371846.001.0001

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Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity

Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity

The Development of Nietzsche’s Metaethics (co-authored with David Dudrick)

Chapter:
(p.97) { 5 } Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity
Source:
Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics
Author(s):

Maudemarie Clark

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199371846.003.0006

This chapter argues against Brian Leiter's claim that Nietzsche does not believe in the objectivity of any values, and that he therefore does not consider his own values any more objective than the moral values against which he campaigns. Leiter treats the questions concerning the objectivity of Nietzsche's values as “broadly speaking, metaethical in nature,” as questions concerning the metaphysical or epistemological status of those values. The chapter argues against his position on these questions by offering an account of the development of Nietzsche's metaethics from Human, All-Too-Human through his later works.

Keywords:   morality, ethics, moral values, Brian Leiter, metaethics, Human, All-Too-Human

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