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Motivational Internalism$
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Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199367955

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001

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Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance

Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance

Chapter:
(p.260) 13 Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance
Source:
Motivational Internalism
Author(s):

Kate Manne

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0013

This chapter explores a way of tempering motivational internalism that is held to render it more plausible, while preserving at least something of the spirit of the original position. According to this proposal, when an agent makes a first-person moral judgment about what she ought to do, there is still an expectation that she will be motivated to act accordingly. But the expectation here is normative rather than purely predictive. Essentially, such judgments will entail moral motivations when the agent occupies the appropriate practical stance with respect to said actions—namely, the participatory stance, following P. F. Strawson; whereas if the agent lacks the sense of herself as an active participant in practice, then her moral judgments about what she ought to do may fail to do what they ought to do, i.e. to mobilize her for action. This is held to constitute a defect in a judgment of this kind.

Keywords:   motivational internalism, moral judgments, first-person moral judgment, the participatory stance, P. F. Strawson

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