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Private GovernanceCreating Order in Economic and Social Life$
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Edward Peter Stringham

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199365166

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199365166.001.0001

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Rules from Voluntary Associations as an Alternative to Coercive Ones

Rules from Voluntary Associations as an Alternative to Coercive Ones

Governance as a Club Good

(p.21) Chapter 3 Rules from Voluntary Associations as an Alternative to Coercive Ones
Private Governance

Edward Peter Stringham

Oxford University Press

This chapter describes how governance can be analyzed as a club good. Rather than assuming that governance must be provided by government or not at all, the economic theory of clubs describes how many people can jointly consume many goods. Rule-enforcing clubs can be geographically based and have a comprehensive set of rules for many aspects of life (as in a boarding school or a kibbutz), or clubs such as a chess club can be formed for solving problems at small margins within one’s life. On any given day, a person might visit a gated community, an apartment complex, an office complex, a corporation, a shopper’s club, a country club, or a nightclub. As voluntary associations that must compete for members, clubs allow for choice, variation, experimentation, and solutions that vary according to the challenges at hand.

Keywords:   public goods, private goods, economics of clubs, reason of rules, club

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