Tarski, Neurath, and Kokoszyńska on the Semantic Conception of Truth
Tarski's presentation of the semantic conception of truth at the Paris congress in 1935 gave rise to conflicting positions. While Carnap and others hailed Tarski's definition of truth as a major success in conceptual analysis, others, such as Neurath, expressed serious concerns about Tarski's project. This chapter reviews the debate that accompanied the international recognition of Tarskian semantics by using not only the published sources but also the extended correspondence between Neurath, Tarski, Lutman–Kokoszynska, and Hempel.
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