Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Iris Murdoch, Philosopher$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Justin Broackes

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199289905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289905.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 February 2019

Visual Metaphors in Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy

Visual Metaphors in Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy

Chapter:
(p.306) (p.307) 10 Visual Metaphors in Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy*
Source:
Iris Murdoch, Philosopher
Author(s):

Lawrence Blum

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289905.003.0013

Visual metaphors—attention, perception, seeing, looking, and vision—play a central role in Murdoch’s moral philosophy and moral psychology. This chapter distinguishes three importantly distinct phenomena that Murdoch fails consistently to mark: (1) a conscious and successful perception of moral reality (often called “attention”); (2) a focused act of attention that contributes to structuring the world of value as seen by an individual agent, but which can be distorted so that it is not focused on moral reality; (3) the habitual and unselfconscious way of taking in the world around us that has been structured by various forces, including but not limited to (1) and (2). In her account of why people fail to grasp moral reality, Murdoch privileges individual psychological obstacles (illusion, fantasy, self-centered distortion) but neglects social forms of obstacles-stereotypes about race- or class-based groups, for example-that also contribute to (3) and distort moral perception.

Keywords:   Iris Murdoch, vision, attention, moral perception, social images, stereotypes, deliberation

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .