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Perceptual Experience$
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Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199289769

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001

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Experience and Knowledge

Experience and Knowledge

(p.181) 5 Experience and Knowledge
Perceptual Experience

Anil Gupta

Oxford University Press

This chapter provides outlines of arguments, developed more fully in the author's Empiricism and Experience, for the following theses. (1) If one holds the given in experience (i.e. the rational contribution of experience) to be propositional, then one is forced into accepting a Cartesian conception of experience. (2) The given in experience is hypothetical: experience establishes rational links between views and perceptual judgments; it does not, by itself, entitle one to perceptual judgments. (3) The hypothetical given is not only compatible with the categorical demands of empirical rationality; it makes available a defensible empiricism.

Keywords:   experience, empiricism, rationality, perceptual judgment, the given, cartesian conceptions, solipsism

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