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Perceptual Experience$
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Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199289769

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001

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Is There a Perceptual Relation?

Is There a Perceptual Relation?

(p.126) 3 Is There a Perceptual Relation?
Perceptual Experience

Tim Crane

Oxford University Press

Many philosophers think that a central question in the philosophy of mind is the question of whether perceptual experience involves ‘qualia’, understood as intrinsic, non-representational qualities of experience. This chapter argues that as far as perceptual experience is concerned (as opposed to experience of other kinds) this is not a central issue, since it is not motivated by the central puzzle or paradox of the philosophy of perception, which is the argument from illusion or hallucination. It outlines a general conception of the philosophy of perception which locates the central debate as that between those who think perception is a fundamentally a form of representation or intentionality, and those who think that it should be primarily understood in terms of an irreducible relation to the environment.

Keywords:   perception, experience, qualia, disjunctivism, intentionality, representation, argument from illusion, conception of experience, representationalism, intentionalism

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