Accounts of personal identity that are grounded in experiential continuity are by no means new. This chapter compares the merits of C-theory with some of its competitors. According to one tradition, the self is an experiential ingredient within consciousness. The doctrine can be found in William James, C. O. Evans, Stephen Priest (the latter holds that the self can be identified with phenomenal space), and Galen Strawson. These accounts all have the disadvantage of restricting the self to a single stream (or burst) of consciousness, the C-theory does not. John Foster and Peter Unger also defend experience-based accounts which allow subjects to survive periods of unconsciousness, but their accounts also prove problematic, albeit for different reasons.
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