Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Knowing PersonsA Study in Plato$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Lloyd P. Gerson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288670

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288670.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 18 July 2018

Theaetetus: What is Knowledge?

Theaetetus: What is Knowledge?

Chapter:
(p.194) CHAPTER 5 Theaetetus: What is Knowledge?
Source:
Knowing Persons
Author(s):

Lloyd P. Gerson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288670.003.0006

The central thesis of this chapter is that Theaetetus reinforces the account of knowledge in Republic. Theaetetus does this despite the nominal άπορία at the end of the dialogue. This view seems increasingly to be out of favour, for it has recently been argued that Theaetetus rejects the discontinuity of έπιστήμη and δόξα, strongly implying, on the contrary, that έπιστήμη of the sensible world is possible. If this is so, then presumably there can be έπιστήμη and δόξα of the same objects. And if this is so, then there would seem to be nothing in principle against there being δόξα of the Forms or knowledge of sensibles. Accordingly, the criteria for knowledge, which entail that there is knowledge only of immaterial entities, would have to be revised.

Keywords:   Plato, Theaetetus, knowledge, sense-perception, true belief, Republic

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .