- Title Pages
- List of Contributors
- 1 Referee Reports on Fitch's “A Definition of Value”
- 2 A Logical* Analysis of Some Value Concepts<sup>1</sup>
- 3 Knowability Noir: 1945–1963
- 4 Fitch's Paradox of Knowability
- 5 The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection
- 6 Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox
- 7 Beyond the Limits of Knowledge
- 8 Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities
- 9 Actions That Make Us Know
- 10 Can Truth Out?
- 11 Logical Types in Some Arguments about Knowability and Belief
- 12 Tennant's Troubles
- 13 Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope
- 14 Revamping the Restriction Strategy
- 15 On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox
- 16 Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics
- 17 Performance and Paradox
- 18 The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond
- 19 Invincible Ignorance
- 20 Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch‐Style Reasoning
- 21 Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
- (p.1) Introduction
- New Essays on the Knowability Paradox
Joe Salerno (Contributor Webpage)
- Oxford University Press
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the knowability paradox and how the knowability principle has been claimed for a number of historic non-realisms, including Michael Dummett's semantic anti-realism, Hilary Putnam's internal realism, the logical positivisms of the Berlin and Vienna Circles, Peirce's pragmatism, Kant's transcendental idealism, and Berkeley's metaphysical idealism. Fitch's generalization of the knowability result is presented followed by an overview of the subsequent chapters.
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