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New Essays on the Knowability Paradox$
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Joe Salerno

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199285495

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

Joe Salerno (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the knowability paradox and how the knowability principle has been claimed for a number of historic non-realisms, including Michael Dummett's semantic anti-realism, Hilary Putnam's internal realism, the logical positivisms of the Berlin and Vienna Circles, Peirce's pragmatism, Kant's transcendental idealism, and Berkeley's metaphysical idealism. Fitch's generalization of the knowability result is presented followed by an overview of the subsequent chapters.

Keywords:   knowability paradox, knowability principle, Fitch paradox, Michael Dummett

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