Individuals and properties in an ontology of states of affairs
This chapter focuses on a particularly important set of philosophical implications of the account of ontological categories. This account is fundamentally structuralist: it tries to get at information about the different constituents of states of affairs not by any direct information about them but by considering specific relations between them, that is information about which of them can go together to form states of affairs. It is interesting to note that a certain distinction between constituents of states of affairs, which would normally be regarded as clearly structural, cannot in fact be structural at all given that they cannot be distinguished by the structuralist account of ontological categories. This chapter shows why this is so and what wider philosophical implications it has.
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