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Content, Cognition, and CommunicationPhilosophical Papers II$

Nathan Salmon

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199284726

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.001.0001

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(p.351) Bibliography of Nathan Salmon, 1979–2006

(p.351) Bibliography of Nathan Salmon, 1979–2006

Source:
Content, Cognition, and Communication
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Books

Essentialism in Current Theories of Reference (1979 UCLA doctoral dissertation, University Microfilms International, 1980).

Reference and Essence (Princeton University Press, 1981; and Basil Blackwell, 1982).

Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1986).

Propositions and Attitudes, Co‐edited (with Scott Soames) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1988).

Frege's Puzzle (Second Edition) (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1991).

Reference and Essence, Korean translation by Joonho Park, Chonbuk National University, Korea (Korea: Hankook, 2000).

Reference and Essence (Second Edition) (Prometheus Books, 2005).

Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophical Papers I (Oxford University Press, 2005).

†† Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II (Oxford University Press, 2006).

Articles

Note: Articles marked † appear in Volume I, those marked †† in Volume II.

Critical Review of Leonard Linsky, Names and Descriptions, The Journal of Philosophy, 76, 8 (August 1979), pp. 436–452.

‘How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference’, The Journal of Philosophy, 76, 12 (December 1979), pp. 703–725.

†† ‘Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions’, Philosophical Studies, 42, 1 (July 1982), pp. 37–45.

‘Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox: A Reply to David Over’, Philosophical Books, 25, 1 (January 1984), pp. 7–11.

† ‘Impossible Worlds’, Analysis, 44, 3 (June 1984), pp. 114–117.

†† ‘Reflexivity’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27, 3 (July 1986), pp. 401–429;

reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1988), pp. 240–274.

‘Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints’, in Peter French, Theodore Uehling, Jr., and Howard Wettstein, eds, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 75–120.

† ‘Existence’, in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 1: Metaphysics (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1987), pp. 49–108.

† ‘The Fact that x=y’, Philosophia (Israel), 17, 4 (December 1987), pp. 517–518.

† Critical Review of David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, The Philosophical Review, 97, 2 (April 1988), pp. 237–244.

†† ‘How to Measure the Standard Meter’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 88 (1987/1988), pp. 193–217.

(p.352) ‘Introduction’ to Propositions and Attitudes (co‐authored with Scott Soames, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1988), pp. 1–15.

† ‘The Logic of What Might Have Been’, The Philosophical Review, 98, 1 (January 1989), pp. 3–34.

‘Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions’, in Dov Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, eds, Handbook of Philosophical Logic IV: Topics in the Philosophy of Language (Dordrecht: Springer, 1989), Chapter IV.5, pp. 409–461.

‘How to Become a Millian Heir’, Noûs, 23, 2 (April 1989), pp. 211–220.

‘Tense and Singular Propositions’, in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds, Themes from Kaplan (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 331–392.

†† ‘Illogical Belief’, in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1989), pp. 243–285.

†† ‘A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn’, in C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, eds, Propositional Attitudes: the Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind (Stanford, Calif.: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 1990), pp. 215–247.

‘Temporality’, in William Bright, ed., Oxford International Encyclopedia of Linguistics (Oxford University Press, 1990).

‘Singular Terms’, in Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, eds, Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1990).

†† ‘How Not to Become a Millian Heir’, Philosophical Studies, 62, 2 (May 1991), pp. 165–177.

†† ‘The Pragmatic Fallacy’, Philosophical Studies, 63, 1 (July 1991), pp. 83–97.

†† ‘Reflections on Reflexivity’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, 1 (February 1992), pp. 53–63.

† ‘On Content’, Mind, 101, 404 (October 1992; special issue commemorating the centennial of Gottlob Frege's ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’), pp. 733–751.

†† ‘Relative and Absolute Apriority’, Philosophical Studies, 69, (1993), pp. 83–100.

† ‘This Side of Paradox’, Philosophical Topics, 21, 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 187–197.

† ‘A Problem in the Frege–Church Theory of Sense and Denotation’, Noûs, 27, 2 (June 1993), pp. 158–166.

†† ‘Analyticity and Apriority’, in J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 7: Language and Logic (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1993), pp. 125–133.

‘Sense and Reference’, in Robert M. Harnish, ed., Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language (Prentice‐Hall and Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 99–129.

Frege's Puzzle (excerpts)’, in Robert M. Harnish, ed., Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language (Prentice‐Hall and Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 447–489.

†† ‘Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt’, Noûs, 29, 1 (January 1995), pp. 1–20.

†† ‘Relational Belief’, in Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, eds, On Quine: New Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 206–228.

‘Reference: Names, Descriptions, and Variables’, in Marcelo Dascal, Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle, eds, Handbuch Sprachphilosophie: Volume 2 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1996), pp. 1123–1152.

‘Trans‐World Identification and Stipulation’, Philosophical Studies, 84, 2–3 (December 1996), pp. 203–223.

† ‘Wholes, Parts, and Numbers’, in J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 11: Mind, Causation, and World (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1997), pp. 1–15.

† ‘Nonexistence’, Noûs, 32, 3 (September 1998), pp. 277–319.

(p.353) †† ‘Is De Re Belief Reducible to De Dicto?’ in A. A. Kazmi, ed., Meaning and Reference, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 23, 1997, (University of Calgary Press, 1998), pp. 85–110.

‘Kripke’, entry in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 1995, 1999), p. 476.

‘Preface’ to the Korean Translation of Reference and Essence, Korean translation by Joonho Park (Korea: Hankook, 2000).

† ‘The Limits of Human Mathematics’, in J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 15: Metaphysics, 2001 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 93–117.

† ‘Mythical Objects’, in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier, eds, Meaning and Truth, Proceedings of the Eastern Washington University and the University of Idaho Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Meaning (Seven Bridges Press, 2002), pp. 105–123.

‘Puzzles about Intensionality’, in Dale Jacquette, ed., Blackwell Companion to Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 73–85.

† ‘The Very Possibility of Language: A Sermon on the Consequences of Missing Church’, C. A. Anderson and M. Zeleny, eds, Logic, Meaning and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 573–595.

† ‘Identity Facts’, in C. Hill, ed., Philosophical Topics, 30, 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 237–267.

†† ‘Demonstrating and Necessity’, The Philosophical Review, 111, 4 (October 2002), pp. 497–537.

‘Naming, Necessity, and Beyond’, Mind, 112, 447 (July 2003), pp. 475–492.

† ‘Tense and Intension’, in A. Jokic, ed., Time, Tense, and Reference (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 107–154.

‘Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions’ (revised), in Dov Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, eds, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Second Edition, 10 (Boston: Kluwer, 1989, 2003), pp. 39–85.

Wei man ein Millianer wird’ (German translation of ‘How to Become a Millian Heir’), in Mark Textor, ed., Neue Theorien der Referenz (New Theories of Reference, Paderborn, Germany: Mentis Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 38–47.

Die Krux von Freges Rätsel’ (German translation of an excerpt from Frege's Puzzle), in Mark Textor, ed., Neue Theorien der Referenz (New Theories of Reference, Paderborn, Germany: Mentis Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 60–71.

†† ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, in A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer, eds, Descriptions and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 230–260.

†† ‘Two Conceptions of Semantics’, in Zoltan Szabo, ed., Semantics versus Pragmatics (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 317–328.

†† ‘Are General Terms Rigid?’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 28, 1 (2005), pp. 117–134.

‘Proper Names and Descriptions’, in Donald M. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Second Edition) (New York: Macmillan, 2005).

‘Letter to Teresa Robertson’, in Reference and Essence (2nd Edition), pp. 369–375.

† ‘On Designating’, Mind, 114, 456 (October 2005), pp. 1069–1133.

† ‘A Father's Message’, Preface to Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning.

† ‘Modal Logic Kalish‐and‐Montague Style’, in Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning, chapter 4.

† ‘Personal Identity: What's the Problem?’ in J. Berg, ed., Proceedings of the University of Haifa International Conference on the Work of Saul Kripke: Naming, Necessity, and More (forthcoming).

†† ‘The Resilience of Illogical Belief’, Noûs 40, 2 (June 2006), pp. 369–375.

‘Terms in Bondage’, Philosophical Issues, 16, Philosophy of language (2006), pp. 263–274.

(p.354) †† ‘A Theory of Bondage’, The Philosophical Review 115, 4 (October 2006), pp. 415–448.

† ‘Pronouns as Variables', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, symposium on Alan Berger's Terms and Truth (2006).

‘Semantics vs. Pragmatics’, in Richard Schantz, ed., What is Meaning? (New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming 2007).

‘Quantifying Into the Unquantifiable: The Life and Work of David Kaplan’, to appear in a festschrift for David Kaplan edited by J. Almog and P. Leonardi, eds; available online at http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/phil/Lectures/DavidFest/DavidFest.htm.

‘Three Perspectives on Quantifying In’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming 2007).

‘Points, Complexes, Complex Points, and a Yacht’, in N. Griffin and D. Jacquette, eds, the proceedings of the McMaster University conference on Russell vs. Meinong: 100 Years after ‘On Denoting’ (forthcoming 2007).

‘Constraint with Restraint’, to appear in G. Ostertag, ed., Festschrift for Stephen Schiffer.

‘What is Existence?’ to appear in H. Deutsch and A. Everett, eds (forthcoming 2007).

‘On Sense and Direct Reference’, forward to Matthew Davidson, ed., On Sense and Direct Reference (McGraw‐Hill, 2007).

‘ “Must” and “Might” ’, for a chapter on modal logic to appear in D. Kalish, R. Montague, G. Mar, and N. Salmon, Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning (Third Edition), Oxford University Press.