This book chronicles how a controversial set of policy assumptions about the Japanese economy, known as revisionism, rose to become the basis of the trade policy approach of the Clinton administration. In the context of deep-rooted fears over Japan's increasing economic strength, revisionists argued that Japan represented a distinctive form of capitalism that was inherently closed to imports and that posed a threat to U.S. high-tech industries. Revisionists advocated a “managed trade” solution in which the Japanese government would be forced to set aside a share of the market for foreign goods ... More

This book chronicles how a controversial set of policy assumptions about the Japanese economy, known as revisionism, rose to become the basis of the trade policy approach of the Clinton administration. In the context of deep-rooted fears over Japan's increasing economic strength, revisionists argued that Japan represented a distinctive form of capitalism that was inherently closed to imports and that posed a threat to U.S. high-tech industries. Revisionists advocated a “managed trade” solution in which the Japanese government would be forced to set aside a share of the market for foreign goods. The author describes the role that various American academics, government officials, and business leaders played in developing revisionist thought. The revisionist drumbeat grew loudest just as the Clinton administration came into office. The author uses extensive interviews with policy makers to trace the internal discussions inside the Clinton White House, which culminated in the adoption of revisionist assumptions and then to demands for “results-oriented” trade agreements during the Framework negotiations. Japan, however, refused to accept these managed trade solutions, and fought to discredit revisionism and to rally global support against American unilateralism. Despite a history of caving in to U.S. pressures, this time the Japanese held firm even in the face of an historic failure of a bilateral summit in 1994 and the threat of sanctions against Japanese autos in 1995. In the end, it was the U.S. that folded; for the first time ever, Japan said “no,” and in the process beat back America's demands for managed trade once and for all.