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Policy Bureaucracy$
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Edward C Page and Bill Jenkins

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199280414

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280414.001.0001

Discretion, Cues and Authority

Chapter:
(p. 107 ) 5 Discretion, Cues and Authority
Source:
Policy Bureaucracy
Author(s):

Edward C Page

Bill Jenkins

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280414.003.0005

The difference between middle-ranking policy bureaucrats and politicians is distinguished in this chapter which presents the different aspects of decision-making in policy initiatives. It also takes an example from the informality of Whitehall departments where hierarchy is not an issue and this informality is linked to middle-ranking officials and ministers, thus providing insights to the role of bureaucratic superiors and the complexity of policy work. Policy officials tend to not have direct and clear instructions from ministers and are only offered advice from senior officials rather than commands and injunctions. This is where administrative discretion is found: where formal rules and relations are silent and officials are allowed to exercise their own preferences.

Keywords:   Great Britain, administrative discretion, ministries, authority, Whitehall departments, informality, political directive, cues and discretion, bureaucratic superiors, decision-making

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