Perspectival Knowing and the Affects
This chapter remains with Genealogy III and examines the positive conception of perspectival knowing which Nietzsche announces as an improved conception of ‘objectivity’. Recent readings have tended not to reflect the prominence Nietzsche gives to affects here. Multiplying perspectives for Nietzsche means multiplying the number of affects one feels towards a subject matter: this, he suggests, enables and enhances knowledge of it. Nietzsche's own procedure of understanding morality via an exploration of various moral feelings is taken as a case in point. The multiplicity of perspectives arises from Nietzsche's radical conception of the self as a collection of drives. The chapter explores whether this conception of the self is sufficient for a conception of knowledge, and whether Nietzsche should require the self to be more of a unified agent in order for his notion of having one's affects ‘in one's power’ and ‘shifting them in out’ to be intelligible.
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