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Mind, Meaning, and KnowledgeThemes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright$
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Annalisa Coliva

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278053

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

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Some Remarks about Minimalism

Some Remarks about Minimalism

(p.195) 7 Some Remarks about Minimalism
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Simon Blackburn

Oxford University Press

The chapter argues that deflationist positions about truth — in particular Paul Horwich’s and Hartry Field’s — are unstable insofar as they guarantee deflationism by inflating other notions. It is maintained that Field’s minimalism relies on the inflationary role of truth-conditions. Horwich’s view, in contrast, is found wanting because it amounts to a contentious form of particularism based on the idea that the reference of terms hinges on our disposition to accept it in the appropriate circumstances. This notion is, in turn, characterized in terms of causal relations, which directly leads to an inflationist territory. In closing, the chapter agrees with Wright that while different discourses may vary from being genuinely representational to purely expressivist, that does not stand in the way of the possibility of embedding sentences characteristic of either domain within truth-disquotational schemas.

Keywords:   deflationism, expressivism, indication relations, minimalism, particularism, propositions, reference, truth

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