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Mind, Meaning, and KnowledgeThemes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright$
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Annalisa Coliva

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278053

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

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The Publicity of Meaning and the Interiority of Mind 1

The Publicity of Meaning and the Interiority of Mind 1

(p.127) 5 The Publicity of Meaning and the Interiority of Mind1
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Barry C. Smith

Oxford University Press

In his writings on the later Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright deals in detail with two themes he sees as closely related: the nature of our knowledge of our own intentional states and the nature of rule-following. Wright’s work brings out deep connections between the two issues and he attempts to provide a similar epistemological treatment of both. However, in each case, the first-person perspective of the thinker and rule-follower goes missing from the accounts of the special way we know our own minds and meanings. The chapter shows that other parts of Wright’s work provide him with the resources to provide a fully satisfying account that reconciles the inner and outer aspects of mind and meaning.

Keywords:   meaning, mind, language, publicity, privacy, first-person perspective, inner, Wittgenstein, self-knowledge

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