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Mind, Meaning, and KnowledgeThemes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright$
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Annalisa Coliva

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278053

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

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Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate

Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate

Chapter:
(p.96) 4 Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate
Source:
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
Author(s):

Akeel Bilgrami

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0005

This chapter spells out what the normativity of intentions (and intentionality) consists in for Wittgenstein and then argues that the intentions that go into the production of meaning (for instance, in the production of meaningful linguistic speech) are degenerate forms of intention in which the normativity that, in general, holds of intentions, is missing. This has the effect, in turn, of undermining the assumption that meanings are normative. The argument makes central use (a) of the Gricean framework for relating meaning with intentions and (b) of the role of a Fregean notion of sense in our understanding of linguistic meaning.

Keywords:   meaning, intention, normativity, rule-following, sense, truth-conditions, self-knowledge, Wittgenstein, Grice, Frege

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