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Mind, Meaning, and KnowledgeThemes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright$
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Annalisa Coliva

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278053

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

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Replies Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of Meaning

Replies Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of Meaning

Boghossian, Peacocke, Horwich, and Bilgrami

Chapter:
(p.379) Replies Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of Meaning
Source:
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
Author(s):

Crispin Wright

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0015

The replies in this part of the book are divided into four chapters. In this first one, the issues raised by Boghossian, Peacocke, Horwich, and Bilgrami concerning the problem of rule-following and the normativity of meaning are addressed, and an up-to-date overview of Crispin Wright's current views on these matters is presented.

Keywords:   rule-following, normativity of meaning, Crispin Wright

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