Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Mind, Meaning, and KnowledgeThemes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Annalisa Coliva

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278053

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 March 2019

Wright Against the Sceptics

Wright Against the Sceptics

(p.352) 13 Wright Against the Sceptics
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge

Michael Williams

Oxford University Press

Wright defines a cornerstone as a deep presupposition of the justificatory procedures appropriate to some vital area of discourse. According to Wright, one of the most powerful sceptical strategies is to argue that no cornerstone commitment can be justified in a non-question-begging way, with the result that beliefs in the area of discourse for which it is a cornerstone also lack warrant. Taking his cue from Wittgenstein, Wright replies that this argumentative strategy involves a lacuna. Cornerstones are rationally warranted, by virtue of being rational but unearned entitlements. Though sympathetic to many things that Wright has to say, the chapter argues that his response to the sceptic is far more concessive that it should be. The chapter concludes by suggesting how a much less concessive response may be attempted.

Keywords:   cognitive locality, cornerstone strategy, default and challenge, entitlement, externalism, foundationalism, justification, scepticism, warrant, Wittgenstein

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .