In this Introduction the chapters in the volume are briefly presented and placed in the context of Crispin Wright’s far-reaching contribution to several different areas of philosophy. The first section traces his basic ideas regarding the so-called ‘rule-following problem’, and its underpinnings for the nature of meaning and of mental content. The second section canvasses Wright’s ideas about self-knowledge, viz. the characteristic human way of knowing our own mental states. The third one addresses his views about the realism and anti-realism debate and the connected problem of the nature of truth and the feasibility of relativism. Finally, the fourth section summarizes Wright’s contribution to epistemology, focusing on his views about the structure of empirical warrants, the cogency of Moore’s proof of an external world, scepticism about the material world, and his notion of entitlement.
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