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The Epistemology of Testimony$
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Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276011

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001

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Getting Told and Being Believed

Getting Told and Being Believed

Chapter:
(p.272) 12 Getting Told and Being Believed
Source:
The Epistemology of Testimony
Author(s):

Richard Moran

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0013

This chapter argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross, which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological light, concentrating on just how the recognition of the speaker's self-reflexive intention is supposed to count for his audience as a reason to believe P. This is understood as the speaker's explicitly assuming responsibility for the truth of his statement, and thereby constituting his utterance as a reason to believe.

Keywords:   Grice, assurance, evidence, telling, Angus Ross

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