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Moral Fictionalism
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Moral Fictionalism

Mark Eli Kalderon

Abstract

Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive ... More

Keywords: morality, moral discourse, moral sentences, moral propositions, moral properties, noncognitivism, moral fictionalism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2005 Print ISBN-13: 9780199275977
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Mark Eli Kalderon, author
Department of Philosophy, University College London
Author Webpage

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