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Second PhilosophyA Naturalistic Method$
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Penelope Maddy

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199273669

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.001.0001

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Caveats

Caveats

Chapter:
(p.299) III.8 Caveats
Source:
Second Philosophy
Author(s):

Penelope Maddy (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0022

This chapter summarizes the many empirical theories and methods involved in this second-philosophical account of logical truth: the KF-structuring of (much of) the world, the experimental paradigms underlying the research on infant and animal cognition, the treatment of mental representation, etc. All science is fallible, and any of these components might fail. This would be disheartening to a philosopher in search of certainty, but it is only to be expected by the Second Philosopher, who doesn't undertake to philosophize from a point of view more secure than that of science.

Keywords:   certainty, experimental paradigm, fallibilism, infant studies, KF-structure, mental representation

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