Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Second PhilosophyA Naturalistic Method$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Penelope Maddy

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199273669

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 December 2018



(p.152) II.4 Disquotation
Second Philosophy

Penelope Maddy (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Returning to the debate itself, does a full account of how humans use language require a correspondence theory of truth and reference? This chapter argues that disquotationalism is fully up to the job of explaining how our language use succeeds in guiding our worldly actions — because our beliefs are good indicators of the facts (often not because they are true) — and also what happens when language is vague or non-factual or indeterminate. Indeed the second-philosophical disquotationalist's analysis of well-trod cases like Priestley's talk of ‘dephlogisticated air’ involve careful analyses of indications relations that run parallel to the detailed work of causal theorists of reference. Word-world relations are as central to her account of language use as they are to correspondence theories; it's just that she doesn't share the belief that, e.g., the facts about Priestley and the world determine whether or not a given one of his utterances refers to oxygen. For her, this is a matter of how we interpret him into our current language, and that may vary with the context and goals of the interpretation.

Keywords:   causal theory of reference, correspondence theories, disquotationalism, phlogiston, Priestley, truth

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .