Returning to the debate itself, does a full account of how humans use language require a correspondence theory of truth and reference? This chapter argues that disquotationalism is fully up to the job of explaining how our language use succeeds in guiding our worldly actions — because our beliefs are good indicators of the facts (often not because they are true) — and also what happens when language is vague or non-factual or indeterminate. Indeed the second-philosophical disquotationalist's analysis of well-trod cases like Priestley's talk of ‘dephlogisticated air’ involve careful analyses of indications relations that run parallel to the detailed work of causal theorists of reference. Word-world relations are as central to her account of language use as they are to correspondence theories; it's just that she doesn't share the belief that, e.g., the facts about Priestley and the world determine whether or not a given one of his utterances refers to oxygen. For her, this is a matter of how we interpret him into our current language, and that may vary with the context and goals of the interpretation.
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